Lydia O. Chua Vs. The Civil Service Commission, The National Irrigation Administration

Lydia O. Chua, Petitioner

Vs.

The Civil Service Commission, The National Irrigation Administration, Respondents

G.R. No. 88979, February 7, 1992

Facts:

Republic Act 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 (Coverage) of R.A. 6683 provides who are qualified to avail the benefits under the law which includes all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have rendered two consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation with the exception of uniformed personnel of (Armed Forced of the Philippines) AFP and (Philippine Constabulary Integrated National Police) PC/INP.

Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the Early Retirement Law, filed an application to the Respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA), which was denied since petitioner is a co-terminus employee.

She appealed with respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) but which was also denied because contractual employees are excluded from the coverage. The date of the petitioner's separation from the service is co-terminus with the NIA project which is contractual nature.

Chua then elevated the issue to the Supreme Court by way of Special Civil action for certiorari insisting that she is entitled to the benefits under R.A. 6683.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioner's status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the coverage of R.A. 6683.

Held:

No. There is no substantial between a co-terminus employee and a contractual, casual, emergency employee which are all tenurial employees with no fixed term, non career and temporary. The Early Retirement Law would violated equal protection clause if a group or class of employees would be denied with benefits that are received by a class of equal or similar footing. The doctrine of necessary implications should be applied. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute us as much as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose.