Felicito Basbacio Vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice, Franklin Drilon in his capacity as Secretary of Justice
Felicito Basbacio, Petitioner
Vs.
Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice, Franklin Drilon in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondent
G.R. No. 109445, November 7, 1994
Facts:
Felicito Basbacio, with his son in law Wilfredo Balderrama, was convicted of the crome of murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of his wife and son, due to an apparent land dispute between the Boyon's and the petitioner.
Felicito Basbacio, with his son in law Wilfredo Balderrama, was convicted of the crome of murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of his wife and son, due to an apparent land dispute between the Boyon's and the petitioner.
Petitioner appealed the matter and he was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son in law. His mere presence was insufficient to show conspiracy.
Petitioner then filed a claim under RA 7309 section 3(a) which provides for the payment of compensation to any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. However, his claim was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, there was nevertheless bad blood between him and the Boyons. There was a basis in finding that he was "probably guilty."
Issue:
Whether or Not the provision of RA 7309 Section 3(a) using the term "unjustly accused" applies to the petitioner?
Whether or Not the provision of RA 7309 Section 3(a) using the term "unjustly accused" applies to the petitioner?
Held:
No. Section 3(a) requires that the claimant be unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned. Through his conviction was reversed, it is not a proof that his previous conviction was unjust. Section 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but the accused must have been also unjustly accused.
No. Section 3(a) requires that the claimant be unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned. Through his conviction was reversed, it is not a proof that his previous conviction was unjust. Section 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but the accused must have been also unjustly accused.
There is the presence of "probable guilt" which does not make the petitioner unjustly accused because there is a reason to believe that he was a part of the crime. The court explained that the term "unjustly convicted or accused" has something to do with the manner of conviction, that there is malice in the judgment rendered, that from the start of the prosecution, it must have been wrongful.
An accusation based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and unjust judgment, but only an erroneous one correctable by appeal.
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